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Case No. 20110274 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
RAMIRO OSEGUERA, JR., 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Oseguera pled guilty to third degree felony theft. The trial court reduced 
the degree of offense to a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
402(2) (West Supp. 2010), after Oseguera had successfully completed his 
probation. Oseguera appeals from the trial court's denial of his subsequent 
request to retroactively reduce his already-served sentence. This Court has 
jurisdiction over appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2011). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West Supp. 2010) allows a trial court to 
reduce an offender's criminal offense by one degree, if the court finds it 
appropriate to do so. 
The statute sets forth two scenarios under which a section 402 reduction 
may be granted. First, subsection (1) states that a section 402 reduction may be 
granted at the time of sentencing, in which case the sentence should also be 
modified to comport with the reduced level of offense. Subsection (2) provides 
that a section 402 reduction may be granted following an offender's successful 
completion of probation, but does not provide for a reduction in the sentence. 
Issue: Under Subsection (2), may a trial court, in addition to reducing the 
degree of offense, retroactively reduce the sentence that has already been 
served? 
Standard of Review. Questions of statutory interpretation, like all questions 
of law, are reviewed for correctness. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 15, 44 P.3d 
781. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are attached as Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West Supp. 2010); 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE 
Oseguera pled guilty to a charge of theft, a third degree felony, on 
January 22,2002. (R.28-35). As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors agreed 
not to oppose "402(b) consideration upon completion of probation/' (R.32). 
Oseguera was then sentenced to one indeterminate sentence of up to five years 
in prison, which was suspended. (R.47). He was sentenced to a term of sixty 
days in jail and supervised probation for thirty-six months. (R.48). On 
November 4,2003, Oseguera successfully completed his probation. (R.52). 
Nearly seven years later, on January 26,2010, Oseguera moved to reduce 
his sentence under section 76-3-402(2).l (R.54). A hearing on the motion was 
held on March 9,2010. (R.55). In accordance with the plea agreement, the State 
did not object and Oseguera's 402 reduction was granted. The trial court 
reduced Oseguera's offense to a class A misdemeanor. (R.57&58). 
Ten months later, on January 31, 2011, Oseguera filed a "Stipulated 
Emergency Motion to Clarify Judgment on 402 Motion/' (R.59). In that motion, 
Oseguera asked the trial court to reduce his sentence. (R.60). Oseguera argued 
1
 When Oseguera was sentenced, the provisions of section 76-3-402(2) 
were found in section 76-3-402(b)(2). Section 76-3-402 was amended and 
renumbered in 2006 and 2007. The amended version of the statute applied at 
the time Oseguera filed his 402 reduction motion. See State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 
138, If 15,233 P.3d 828,833, cert, denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010). Accordingly, 
this brief cites only to the current version of section 402. 
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that section 76-3-402(2) requires not only that the degree of his offense be reduced 
to a class A misdemeanor, but also that his sentence be reduced to that of a class 
A misdemeanor. The trial court denied Oseguera's motion on the ground tihat 
the plain language of section 76-3-402(2) does not authorize a trial court to alter 
a sentence already served. (R.64). 
The trial court entered its order denying the motion on March 4, 2011. 
Oseguera filed his notice of appeal on March 22,2011. (R.70). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly concluded that section 76-3-402(2) does not 
authorize it to reduce Oseguera's sentence more than seven years after his 
sentence had been served. First, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to change 
Oseguera's sentence once it had validly imposed a sentence and Oseguera had 
already served that sentence by completing probation. 
Second, as the trial court correctly observed, the plain language of section 
402(2) does not authorize a court to reduce the sentence once it has already been 
served. At that point, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to reduce 
Oseguera's sentence, because a valid sentence had already been imposed. 
-4-
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IT 
WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO REDUCE THE SENTENCE 
A. A trial court loses jurisdiction to alter a sentence once it has been 
validly imposed. 
Utah law permits a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991). 
l«/V^V~t<l k4.U?1~ U l l XJLAV-E-CHLX L » C i l l . ^ X l \ . V Al_> V W X V A / U 1 V . WXXM.X C V U A k A V* t U X X txD j U X X U V I X V - t X V X l V V K^ Jk M I V 
case, allowing the court to revisit the sentence. Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679 (citation 
omitted). But once a valid sentence is legally imposed, the trial court loses 
jurisdiction over the sentence. Id. (citing State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 
1991)). Thus, once a valid sentence is imposed, the trial court cannot change it. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679; Babbel, 813 P.2d at 87 n.3. This 
is true even if a court suspends a sentence and imposes probation. See State v. 
Anderson, 2009 UT 13, ^ 15, 203 P.3d 990 ("[I]f a judge revokes probation, she 
may only execute the previously imposed suspended sentence/'); Salt Lake City 
v. Jaramillo, 2007 UT App. 32, If 12, 156 P.3d 839 ("[OJnce a defendant is 
sentenced and placed on probation, revocation of probation can result only in 
'the sentence previously imposed [being] executed/") (citation omitted). 
Here, Oseguera does not dispute that his original sentence was valid at 
the time it was imposed. Nor could he. He was sentenced to the statutory 
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prison term of up to five years in prison. (RAT). That sentence was suspended 
and Osegura was placed on probation. Oseguera's sentence thus complied with 
applicable statutes in every respect. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (West 
2010). Because Oseguera's sentence was valid, the trial court lost jurisdiction to 
alter it. See Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679 (citing Babbel, 813 P.2d at 88). 
Moreover, as stated, Oseguera served his valid sentence when he 
successfully completed his probation. (R.52). Inexplicably, he waited nearly 
seven years before moving to reduce the degree of his offense under Section 76-
3-402(2). (R.54). The prosecution honored the plea agreement, and did not 
object to the reduction. Accordingly, the trial court granted Oseguera's motion 
by reducing the degree of his offense from a third degree felony to a class A 
misdemeanor. (R.57&58). Oseguera waited another ten months before filing a 
"Motion to Clarify Judgment on 402 Motion/' (R.59). But while styled as a 
motion to clarify, the motion did not ask the trial court to clarify its previous 
order; rather, it asked the trial court for additional substantive relief: to 
retroactively reduce Oseguera's already-served sentence. (R.60). The trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to change Oseguera's sentence, however, because, as 
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explained, Oseguera's original sentence was valid. The trial court, therefore, 
*\ 
correctly refused to retroactively reduce the sentence. 
B. The trial court correctly read section 76-3-402(2) as not 
authorizing it to reduce Oseguera's already-served sentence. 
The trial court's ruling that section 76-3-402(2) does not authorize a 
reduction of sentence in addition to a reduction in degree of offense was also 
correct. 
The first rule of statutory interpretation is to look to the statute's plain 
language. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, % 17,66 P.3d 592,596. "[Unambiguous 
language may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning/7 Salt Lake City 
v. Roseto, 2002 UT App 66, | 8,44 R2d 835, 837. The Court should not "'infer 
substantive terms into the text that are not already there." Associated Gen. 
Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 112, f 30,38 P.3d 291,301. The 
interpretation of a statute "must be based on the language used, and [the Court 
has] no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an intention not expressed." 
Id. (quoting Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367,370 (Utah 1994)). 
Here, the plain language of the statute does not permit, let alone require, a 
trial court to reduce the sentence once the sentence has been served. Section 76-
2
 The prosecution originally stipulated to the "Motion to Clarify Judgment 
on 402 Motion." However, parties cannot stipulate to jurisdiction where there is 
none. Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172,1173-1174 (Utah App. 1991)(citations 
omitted)(holding parties cannot cure jurisdictional defects by waiver or 
consent). 
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3-402 allows a trial court to reduce the degree of an offense under two 
circumstances. First, under subsection (1), if a reduction is granted at the time of 
sentencing, the court "may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly": 
If at the time of sentencing the court,. . . concludes it would be 
unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree of 
offense established by statute, the court may enter a judgment of 
rnr»yirfir>n for fhp r»PYt InwPT dppT^^ nf nffonco nr\c\ irnr>nc£> 
O 1 
sentence accordingly. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1). Because imposition of the sentence and reduction 
of the offense occur simultaneously, a valid sentence has not previously been 
imposed and the trial court therefore still has jurisdiction over both the degree 
of offense and the sentence imposed. Accordingly, under that circumstance, a 
trial court may reduce the degree of offense and then impose the statutory 
sentence for the reduced offense. 
Oseguera, however, was not granted a section 402 reduction under 
subsection (1). Rather, his section 402 reduction was granted under subsection 
(2). Under that subsection, the court may "enter a judgment of conviction for 
the next lower degree of offense," but only if the court suspended execution of 
the sentence and placed the defendant on probation and only after the 
defendant successfully completed probation: 
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places 
the defendant on probation, whether or not the defendant is 
-8-
committed to jail as a condition of probation, the court may enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense: 
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged 
from probation; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2). Unlike subsection (1), subsection (2) does not 
provide for a reduction in sentence; rather, it provides only for a reduction in 
the degree of offense. This makes sense because it is only after a valid sentence 
is imposed and served that a defendant is even eligible to seek the section 402(2) 
reduction. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(2)(a). And, as set forth in subpoint A, 
supra, once a trial court has imposed a valid sentence, it does not have 
jurisdiction to change that sentence. See Montoya, 825 P.2d at 679. 
Oseguera nevertheless argues that subsections (1) and (2) should be read 
together, meaning that the provision allowing a reduced sentence in subsection 
(1) should be read or inserted into subsection (2). See Aplt. Brief at 16-25. The 
subsections by their express terms, however, apply to entirely different 
scenarios and must therefore be read separately. See Cruz-Garza v. Ashcroft, 396 
F.3d 1125,1131-1132 (10th Cir. 2005) (considering Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402, 
subsections (1), (2), and (3) separately). And, as stated, courts may not insert 
substantive terms into the statutory text as it is presumed that the legislature 
used each word advisedly. Associated Gen. Contractors, 2001 UT 112 at % 30 
(quoting Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). Here, the 
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plain language of subsection (2) allows a judge to "enter a judgment of 
conviction for the next lower degree of offense/' Aplt. Brief at 940. But, again, 
it does not allow a judge to reduce a valid sentence already imposed and 
completed. It is reasonable to presume that if the legislature had intended for a 
court to do so under the circumstances contemplated in subsection (2), it would 
have said so in that subsection—just as it did in subsection (1). 
Oseguera also claims that under the rule of lenity the "ameliorative nature 
of 76-3-402" allows a reduction in sentence together with a reduction in degree 
of offense. He asserts that "the major benefit of a reduction in degree of 
conviction is the corresponding reduction of sentence." But Oseguera has 
already served his sentence. It is now too late for him to obtain the benefits of a 
reduced sentence. 
Moreover, Oseguera has already received lenity. His sentence was stayed 
and he was given probation instead of prison. He also received a reduced 
degree of offense, which carries with it many benefits. See, e.g., State v. Gurr, 904 
P.2d 238,244 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Employment opportunities, punishments, 
and expungement procedures all depend on classifications of crime.") 
Oseguera asked for a 402 reduction, which the trial court granted.. The 
trial court did not have the authority to resentence Oseguera. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 1 September 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Jtah Attorney-General 
MICHELLE ITTOUNG/ 
Assistant Attorney (General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West Supp. 2010) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West Supp. 2010) Conviction of lower degree 
of offense — Procedure and limitations 
(1) If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and 
to the history and character of the defendant, and after having given any 
victims present at the sentencing and the prosecuting attorney an 
opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the 
court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense and impose sentence accordingly, 
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the 
defendant on probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail 
as a condition of probation, the court may enter a judgment of conviction 
for the next lower degree of offense: 
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation; 
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney; 
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to 
provide notice to any victims; 
(d) after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c); and 
(e) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense is in the interest of justice. 
(3) (a) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section, 
whether the reduction is entered under Subsection (1) or (2), unless the 
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the 
offense may be reduced two degrees. 
(b) In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more than 
two degrees. 
(4) This section does not preclude any person from obtaining or being 
granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
(5) The court may not enter judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of 
offense if: 
(a) the reduction is specifically precluded by law; or 
(b) if any unpaid balance remains on court ordered restitution for the 
offense for which the reduction is sought. 
(6) When the court enters judgment for a lower degree of offense under 
this section, the actual title of the offense for which the reduction is made 
may not be altered. 
(7) (a) A person may not obtain a reduction under this section of a 
conviction that requires the person to register as a sex offender until the 
registration requirements under Section 77-27-21.5 have expired. 
(b) A person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime 
under Subsection 77-27-21.5(12)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the 
conviction for the offense or offenses that require the person to register as 
a sex offender. 
(8) As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense" includes an 
offense regarding which: 
(a) a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment 
that would increase either the maximum or the minimum sentence; and 
(b) the court removes the statutory enhancement pursuant to this section. 
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